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We analyse the strategy equilibrium of dilemma games considering a payoff matrix affected by small and
random perturbations on the off-diagonal. Notably, a recent work [1] reported that, while cooperation is sus-
tained by perturbations acting on the main diagonal, a less clear scenario emerges when perturbations act on
the off-diagonal. Thus, the second case represents the core of this investigation, aimed at completing the de-
scription of the effects that payoff perturbations have on the dynamics of evolutionary games. Our results,
achieved by analysing the proposed model under a variety of configurations, as different update rules, suggest
that off-diagonal perturbations actually constitute a non-trivial form of noise. In particular, the most interesting
effects are detected near the phase transition, as perturbations tend to move the strategy distribution towards
non-ordered states of equilibrium, supporting cooperation when defection is pervading the population, and
supporting defection in the opposite case. To conclude, we identified a form of noise that, under controlled
conditions, could be used to enhance cooperation, and greatly delay its extinction.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 89.65.-s
I. INTRODUCTION
Perturbative methods find large utilisation for studying a
number of problems in physics, spanning from classical to
quantum mechanics [2, 3]. Furthermore, as we know from the
theory of chaos [4], even small perturbations can have drastic
effects on the dynamics of some systems, as those particularly
sensible to initial conditions. The logistic map, for instance,
is very useful for studying these phenomena. Also, the the-
ory of chaos has the merit to have widely popularised fasci-
nating results, as the so called ’butterfly effect’, being nowa-
days mentioned both in books and movies (e.g. [5]), although
sometimes without proper scientific care.
Perturbations have also been used in evolutionary game the-
ory for studying the emergence of cooperation [6, 7], as re-
cently reported in [1]. Notably, the latter shows that small and
random perturbations on the payoff matrix, of social dilem-
mas, can strongly influence the strategy equilibrium of a pop-
ulation. However, while their effect on the main diagonal has
been clarified, i.e. they support cooperative behaviours, the ef-
fect given by off-diagonal perturbations is still unclear. Thus,
here we aim to clarify this specific aspect of the perturbative
method presented in [1], and to obtain a complete description
of the dynamics of evolutionary games, affected by small and
random perturbations on their payoff matrix. To this end, our
analyses consider a variety of conditions, as three different
update rules, and various games (e.g. Stag-Hunt, Snow-Drift,
and Harmony Game). For the sake of clarity, and for mak-
ing the manuscript self contained, the main model is fully de-
scribed in the following section, with all relevant information.
Before moving further, let us give a brief introduction on the
framework of Evolutionary Game Theory (hereinafter EGT)
that we use for our investigation.
EGT is a suitable framework to study the emergence of co-
operation among selfish individuals [8–10]. While coopera-
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tion still represents a lively challenge [11], EGT has given
many important insights on how such a phenomenon can
spontaneously emerge at many scales in biological and social
systems. Among the most studied mechanisms are kin selec-
tion [12], direct and indirect reciprocity [13, 14], network reci-
procity [15–17], group selection [18] and heterogeneity [19–
21]. Specifically, heterogeneity (sometimes dubbed as diver-
sity) was found to be a fundamental element for supporting
cooperative behaviours in evolutionary systems [22, 23]. A
group composed of individuals with different skills can eas-
ily become more effective in several challenges. At the same
time, group diversity can shield the possible flaws of individ-
ual members while sustaining the whole group in a synergetic
manner. This rationale has been applied to economies, enter-
prise communities, vaccination models, and even in biolog-
ical evolution [22, 24–27]. Besides, that represents a fun-
damental aspect in genetic algorithms as well [28], whose
core mechanism is based on an heterogeneous population of
candidate solutions that evolves towards a (sub-)optimal so-
lution. In EGT, heterogeneity can be related to different as-
pects of a game, e.g. incentives, interaction topology, learning
rates and dynamics. Previous investigations, as [25, 29–35],
showed that heterogeneity can support cooperative behaviours
in many competitive scenarios. At the same time, other studies
as [36], reported small experimental differences between re-
sults achieved on heterogeneous and homogeneous networks,
when humans play the Prisoner’s Dilemma. As another ex-
ample, findings reported in [37] shows a relationship between
the group size of a community and its heterogeneity. This rich
spectrum of results highlights the need to further study this
subject and to fully understand its range of effects.
As observed in [1], perturbations on the payoff matrix of
dilemma games actually are responsible for a form of popula-
tion heterogeneity, as they provide players with a diversified
perception of risks and rewards. For this reason our investiga-
tion, while focused on clarifying the role of perturbations in
social dilemmas, can provide findings of potential interest for
the debate on the relationships between heterogeneity and co-
operation in evolutionary games. Also, the relevance of study-
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2ing the effects of an heterogeneous risk perception is particu-
larly motivated by a simple fact of everyday life, e.g. individ-
uals facing the same situation will have different risk percep-
tions [10]. Financial trading, emergency medicine [38], and
even poker games [39], are just a few examples we can men-
tion to appreciate the relevance of an heterogeneity in risk and
reward perception in a system. For instance, rational, but risky
decisions can be essential to achieve favourable outcomes, and
individuals actually show a variety of behaviours in the above
listed activities. The generality of these considerations makes
the payoff values suitable for being considered as stochastic
variables, instead as fixed values (as per the classic EGT ap-
proach).
One way to study the influence of such random variations is
to represent each different environmental condition as a new
factor in the equations of a model. Following this method,
many authors have done important advances in the under-
standing of how a number of conditions can drive the sys-
tem dynamics, such as resource heterogeneity [40], different
behaviours [41, 42], seasonal variations [29], diverse learn-
ing rates [43], different death rates [44], interaction topolo-
gies [45], and so on. However, another way to understand
these phenomena is to study the behaviour of a population
whose evolution can be affected by a payoff matrix constantly
perturbed by stochastic noise with zero mean value [46–48],
irregardless of its origin. In other words, as the environmental
perturbations are very diverse and frequent, we can suppose
that the sum of infinitely many small perturbations acts as a
stochastic perturbation around an average value. Indeed, the
central limit theorem indicates that the sum of all these un-
correlated perturbations would probably behave as a Gaussian
noise. In this scenario, we are not interested in every single
source of perturbation, but rather, in their collective effect.
We deem relevant to mention previous seminal works
as [49–53], that (to the best of our knowledge) first studied
such disorder in EGT. More recently, the effect of payoff noise
on phase transitions has been the core of many researches that
shed light on how different types of perturbations can lead
to the emergence of cooperation [1, 23, 29, 46, 47, 54–60].
So, here, starting from the model proposed in [1], which in-
troduces payoff perturbation in the context of the imitation
update rule for all payoff entries, we perform a full analysis
under different settings, and then we study the microscopical
mechanism that leads to the observed macroscopic results.
After introducing the proposed model in Section II, we
show the results of numerical simulations (i.e., Section III)
and, eventually, in Section IV, we discuss main findings and
their possible implications.
II. MODEL
For the sake of simplicity, we consider two-strategy games,
where players can either cooperate (C) or defect (D). Mutual
cooperation yields a payoff R (reward) and mutual defection
yields P (punishment). A defector receives a payoff equal to
T (temptation) when interacting with a cooperator, that in turn
receives a payoff equal to S (which usually stands for Sucker’s
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FIG. 1. T × S parameter space with R = 1, P = 0, spanning four
classes of games. The payoff fluctuation acts over T and S simulta-
neously and uncorrelated. Note that local fluctuations can lead play-
ers to play different classes of games depending on the fluctuation
strength.
payoff). Then, we introduce the effects of small payoff per-
turbations, say ε, randomly occurring on the off-diagonal el-
ements of the payoff interaction matrix. As result, the payoff
matrix of any two-player interaction can be written as follows
( C D
C R S + εS
D T + εT P
)
,
where T ∈ [0, 2] and S ∈ [−1, 1]. Without loss of general-
ity, we set R = 1 and P = 0. A similar approach was also
introduced in [50]. It is worth clarifying that εT and εS are in-
dependent random variables with zero average value (ε¯ = 0),
drawn from a uniform distribution unless stated otherwise. At
each new player interaction, the fluctuation is randomly drawn
again, meaning that the noise is not cumulative, nor fixed in
time or space. This is similar to the annealed disorder case of
condensed matter physics [58, 61].
Here, the control parameter for the proposed model is the
perturbation strength D, where for a uniform distribution we
set −D < ε < D. It is useful to remark that this payoff ma-
trix parametrization spans four different classes of games in
the {T, S} parameter space: prisoner’s dilemma (PD), snow-
drift (SD), stag-hunt (SH), and harmony games (HG) [19, 45]
—see Figure 1. We emphasize that even if the average value
of the perturbation is zero, it can be able to (locally) change
the game class to a more friendly or more competitive envi-
ronment from time to time. However, in the long run, there
should be, on average, no unilateral contribution to either.
A general core aspect of evolutionary games is given by
the strategy update dynamics. We can understand it as a two-
step process where: (1) players interact with their neighbours
accumulating a payoff, then (2) they may change strategy ac-
cording to an update rule. Such rules can be defined by taking
into account different aspects of any given system. Here we
consider the usual Imitative rule [45], the Ising (or Glauber
Dynamics) rule [62], and the Dynamic Win-Stay-Lose-Shift
3(WSLS) rule [63]. This is done so we can study the robust-
ness of the effects created by payoff perturbation since previ-
ous works have extensively shown how the update rules can
lead to different behaviours [30–32, 41, 64, 65].
We first present the most usual update rule, the imitative
dynamic. Accordingly, one player, say i, updates its strat-
egy by comparing its payoff with that of one randomly chosen
neighbour, say j. Player i adopts the strategy of player j with
probability
p(∆uij) =
1
1 + e−(uj−ui)/k
, (1)
where k is the irrationality level in the decision process [45]
(similar to the temperature in statistical physics), while ui and
uj represent the player i’s and j’s payoff. We use k = 0.1 for
all simulations unless stated otherwise. The imitation rule is
a non-innovative dynamic [9, 45], because a player can only
change its strategy selecting among those available in the pop-
ulation. This is one of the most explored rules in EGT, and it
is associated with the replicator dynamics observed in biolog-
ical evolution [8]. Because of the extensive research on this
setup, we will focus our analysis mainly on this model.
We present next the so-called Ising rule (also known as
Glauber Dynamics [66]), where players change strategy with
probability
p(∆ui) =
1
1 + e−(u∗i−ui)/k
(2)
with ui player i’s payoff, and u∗i its potential payoff at a next
iteration, if it changed strategy while everything else (i.e. the
strategy set of its neighborhood) remained the same. Recently,
the Ising rule has been studied in [31, 62, 67], showing that it
leads to very different dynamics when compared to imitation
models. In mathematical terms, this setting is equivalent to a
Monte-Carlo process used to describe the dynamics of spins
in a Heisenberg model [68]. In the context of EGT, this up-
date rule is regarded as a player asking himself what would be
the benefits of changing its strategy to a different one. This is
closely related to rational analysis of a situation (see also [69]
on this topic), instead of the reproduction of the ’fittest’ be-
haviour.
Lastly, we also implement the Win-Stay-Lose-Shift
(WSLS) update rule with dynamic aspiration [63]. The WSLS
strategy relies on cognitive capabilities, instead of replicating
process [70–73]. In this case, players change strategy depend-
ing on the degree of satisfaction with their current payoff, in
comparison to the average payoff of their neighbourhood. The
probability of a chosen player to change its strategy to the op-
posite one is given by:
p(∆ui) =
1
1 + e−(u¯−ui)/k
, (3)
where u¯ is the average payoff of the player i’s neighborhood.
To implement such dynamics we use an asynchronous
Monte-Carlo protocol, so that a random player, say the i-th, is
selected and its cumulative payoff, as well as those of its first
and second degree neighbours, are calculated. Then the i-th
player can change its strategy according to the defined update
rule. One Monte Carlo step (MCS) consists of this process
being repeated until each player has had the opportunity to
change its strategy (that is, N times). So, we wait for the sys-
tem to reach a dynamic equilibrium (around 104 MCS’s), and
then we average the values over the final 1000 steps. This is
repeated for 50−100 different samples with the same parame-
ters. A square lattice, with Von Neumann neighbourhood and
periodic boundary conditions with N = 104 individuals, is
the background for our simulations. A detailed discussion on
Monte Carlo methods in evolutionary dynamics is provided
in [45, 74].
III. RESULTS
In this section, we show the results of numerical simula-
tions of the proposed model. For the sake of clarity, irrelevant
error bars are hidden. Figure 2 a) presents the average co-
operation fraction, ρ(t), of a population as time passes, con-
sidering the imitative rule. Also, it shows the evolution of
cooperation for the parameters Tc = 1.04 and S = 0. We re-
mind that for the imitative model with no payoff perturbation,
Tc = 1.04 corresponds to the phase transition point where co-
operation becomes extinct. This was chosen to highlight the
positive effect of payoff perturbation, since its strongest ef-
fect happens near the phase transition boundary. Remarkably,
adding a perturbation as low as D = 0.05 can prevent said
extinction, and for D = 0.2, cooperation can increase even
up to 40%. We note that this increase in cooperation also hap-
pens for a wide range of T values. Qualitatively similar results
were obtained for the Ising and WSLS update rule regarding
the temporal evolution of the population.
The analysis of the temporal evolution indicates that the
noise affects almost immediately the cooperative behaviour.
Using the definitions of Tanimoto [58], we can observe that
the “Endurance” phase (where cooperation initially falls) is
drastically affected. Notably, even for MCS < 20, the noise
enhances cooperation preventing its extinction. The “Expand-
ing” phase is therefore reached for very short times, allowing
cooperation to flourish. Also note that Figure 2 b) presents the
average temporal behavior for T = 0.96. We observe that the
perturbation can be detrimental to cooperation if T < 1, that
is, for more fraternal games. Note however that this detrimen-
tal effect is weaker than the positive effect when T > 1.
Next, we focus on the final equilibrium fraction of cooper-
ators, ρ, for the whole range of T . For simplicity, we present
results for the weak prisoner’s dilemma configuration (i.e.
S = 0). We ran simulations for different S values, and the
general trends are maintained. Figure 3 presents the outcomes
achieved by using the uniform noise distribution in all consid-
ered update rules (i.e. Imitative, WSLS and Ising). Its inset
shows (ρ−ρ0), where ρ0 is the cooperation value for the case
D = 0. This is especially useful to compare the effects of
the payoff perturbation with the unperturbed case, filtering off
the effects of varying T . It is interesting to note that there
is a general trend in all models, i.e. the noise increases co-
operation in the PD region (T > 1), and such enhancement
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FIG. 2. Average evolution of cooperation, ρ(t), for for 100 samples
using the imitative update rule. We set Tc = 1.04 in a), the critical
extinction point for cooperation. Even when the noise is around 5%
of the T value, cooperation can re-emerge. Figure b) presents similar
analysis for T = 0.96. Notice that the x axis is logarithmic.
grows with the noise amplitude, D. We stress here how the
three update rules have very different dynamics, and that even
so, the general effect of the payoff noise was maintained in
all three cases. The inset allows understanding the level of
enhancement caused solely by the noise. In particular, the Im-
itative and WSLS rules present a clear peak, that grows with
D while maintains its position (relative to T ) regardless of the
noise level. It is also very interesting to note that this peak
happens in Tc = 1.04 for the imitative model, and after that,
the positive effect begins to decline. This again reinforces
that the benefit of payoff perturbation is most strong near the
phase transition. At the same time, for T < 1, the noise can
dampen cooperation in different manners for each case. Us-
ing the imitative updating rule, the related drop is very shal-
low ( 15%) and almost independent of D. That is similar to
results achieved by using the WSLS rule. On the other hand,
the Ising rule presents a strong drop in (ρ−ρ0), which is very
dependent on D.
To observe how general the effect can be, we also analysed
a similar setting but with a Gaussian distribution, instead of
a uniform one. In this case, we set our control parameter as
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FIG. 3. Average final cooperation level (ρ) as a function of T for the
imitative (a), WSLS (b) and Ising(c) models using the uniform noise
distribution. The inset shows ρ − ρ0, where ρ0 is the cooperation
value for the case D = 0.
D = σ (i.e. the standard deviation of the distribution). Let us
stress that we cannot directly compare the control parameter
D for both cases since, in the uniform distribution, D is the
range of the distribution, whereas in the Gaussian case, D is
the standard deviation. Even so, D relates to the perturbation
strength in both scenarios. The results are very similar for the
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FIG. 4. Average final cooperation level as a function of T for the im-
itative model, comparing the uniform (continuous lines) and Gaus-
sian (dashed lines) distribution. HereD stands for the strength of the
perturbation. In the uniform distributionD is the range of the pertur-
bation while in the normal distribution it is the standard deviation.
three update rules, with minor quantitative differences. The
general difference being that for Gaussian distributions, coop-
eration is more enhanced than for uniform ones given the same
value of D. This can be credited to the fact that in a Gaussian
distribution with σ = D, although most perturbations will be
equal or smaller than D, there will be rare stronger perturba-
tions occasionally. This, in turn, translates to a more noisy
system that can strongly enhance cooperation.
In figure 4 we present a comparison between the uniform
and Gaussian distributions, using the imitative update rule.
For the sake of clarity, we present onlyD = 0.2 andD = 0.5,
but the effect was similar for all range of D ∈ [0, 1]. As
expected (assuming the same control parameter D for both
cases), the Gaussian distribution has a more pronounced ef-
fect. This suggests that the cooperation enhancement stems
from rare and influential fluctuations, that are more common
in the Gaussian distribution. This is in accordance with a sim-
ilar hypothesis presented in [49–51].
Considering the imitative rule, we varied the noise level,D,
for different T values. Results are presented in Figure 5. The
perturbation has a positive and continuous effect on the coop-
eration in regions where T > 1, and a (small) detrimental ef-
fect if T < 1. Specifically, the strongest cooperation enhance-
ment happens exactly at the phase transition (Tc = 1.04). We
see that payoff perturbation enhances cooperation for egotis-
tic games (T > 1) while it can dampen said cooperation for
fraternal games (T < 1).
To understand whether the cooperation boost is caused by
any kind of random fluctuation, we compare the effects of
payoff perturbation with the noise generated by high irra-
tionality values, k, [69, 75]. As demonstrated by Szab et
al [76], irrationality can have beneficial effects on the main-
tenance of cooperation for some parameter regions. Never-
theless, this is not a linear effect, and there is an “optimal”
irrationality level, after which the system starts to behave ran-
domly, destroying cooperation. Figure 6 illustrates the final
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FIG. 5. Average final cooperation level as a function of perturba-
tion strength D for different values of T . Black circles represent the
critical point Tc = 1.04, were the perturbation effect is stronger.
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FIG. 6. Average final cooperation level as a function of irrationality,
k, in the phase transition T = 1.04 for the imitative model. As
expected, there is an optimal irrationality level for D = 0. Even so,
payoff fluctuations always increases cooperation for the whole range
of explored k values.
average cooperation level as a function of irrationality k for
different payoff perturbation strengths. We see that the payoff
perturbation boosts cooperation regardless of the irrationality
level. Even more, we see that the cooperation enhancement
granted by intermediate levels of irrationality is additive with
the beneficial effect of the payoff perturbation (more strongly
present in the region 0.15 < k < 0.6). We used T = 1.04
for the figure, but this effect remained similar for different T
values and different update rules in our simulations.
We proceed to analyse which microscopic mechanism is re-
sponsible for the cooperation enhancement due to payoff per-
turbation. It is worth noting that lattice snapshots were not
useful in this regard in all three update rule settings. The pop-
ulation has the same general spatial distribution with and with-
out perturbation, i.e., in both cases, cooperators form the usual
clusters surrounded by a sea of defectors. The main differ-
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FIG. 7. Average fraction of each sub-population over 100 Monte-
Carlos runs. Here we used D = 0.3 and T = 1.04, where coop-
eration would be extinct if not for the payoff perturbation. Fraternal
cooperators (CF ) quickly dominate the population being followed by
Egotistic Defectors (DE), Fraternal defectors (DF ) and lastly Ego-
tistic Cooperators (CE).
ence being only that the total fraction of cooperators is greater
as we include perturbations. While this does not present the
cause of the cooperation enhancement, we see that it is not
directly related to a strong spatial distribution effect.
We stress that while the perturbations have zero average
value, they can locally change the game class being played
at each round. Based on this fact, we analyse how players (lo-
cally) fluctuate to a more fraternal or egotistic game. To do
so, we define for each player, at each Monte-Carlo step, the
variable φ = εS − εT . If φ > 0 (φ < 0) the game being
played at a given time will be more fraternal (egotistic). Note
that for every player, φ¯ = 0 for long times. Next, we obtain
at each time step the population fraction of cooperators and
defectors that had φ > 0 in the previous round (named frater-
nal cooperators, CF , and fraternal defectors, DF ). We do the
same for cooperators and defectors with φ < 0 (named ego-
tistic cooperators, CE , and egotistic defectors,DE). By doing
so, we can understand if players strategies are correlated with
φ even if ε is randomly drawn at every interaction.
Figure 7 presents the average evolution of the four sub-
populations for the imitative model in the region where the
perturbation has its strongest effect, i.e. Tc = 1.04. The main
effect of payoff perturbation is to separate the sub-populations
of players who play, on average, more fraternal or egotistic
games. Specifically, fraternal cooperators (CF ) grows more
than any other sub-population, being followed by the egotistic
defectors (DE). It is important to note however that even if
the perturbations are symmetric, CF > DE .
To further explore this, we obtained the fraction of all sub-
populations for different T values. The results are shown in
Figure 8. In it, we can see that this effect happens for all
the relevant T range. On average, sites that have fluctuations
leading to φ > 0 will tend to become cooperators with a
higher frequency than sites that had φ < 0 will become de-
fectors. Note that the symbols in figure 8 present the (nor-
malised) fraction of cooperators that are fraternal, i.e. CF /ρ
(and the normalised fraction of defectors that are egotistic, i.e.
DE/(1 − ρ)). This is especially important, since as T in-
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FIG. 8. Average final fraction of each sub-population (lines) as
we vary T . Here we used D = 0.3. Symbols presents the average
normalised fraction of cooperators that are fraternal, i.e. CF /ρ, and
the average fraction of defectors that are egotistic, i.e. DE/(1− ρ).
Sites that play more fraternal games on average will tend to become
cooperators at a higher frequency then egotistic sites will become
defectors.
creases, the total fraction of cooperators decreases, but even
so, CF /ρ > DE/(1 − ρ). In other words, even if total coop-
eration decreases, the perturbation still induces a flux of coop-
erators to sites where more fraternal games were played. This,
in turn, sustains cooperation for greater ranges of T .
This analysis was also performed for different perturba-
tion strength values (D) to observe how it can affect the
sub-populations. The results are shown in Figure 9. As
expected, the increase in both sub-populations of coopera-
tors is monotonous with D. The inset shows the difference
(CF − CE) as well as (DE − DF ). In it, we can see that
even if a stronger perturbation can lead to a higher value of
(DE −DF ), this value is always lower than (CF − CE). In
other words, agents who play more fraternal sites on average
will have a greater probability of becoming cooperators. On
the other hand, the opposite is not true for players that have
played, on average, more egotistic games, as their average
fraction will be smaller than that of the cooperators. This is
the main mechanism behind cooperation enhancement. Simu-
lations for the WSLS and Ising update rules remained similar
with small quantitative differences, showing how robust this
phenomenon is.
Let us summarise the main mechanism that can increase
cooperation in the proposed model; while players have sym-
metrical perturbations, defectors locally benefit from a more
egotistic game, but cannot maintain said benefit as their clus-
ters do not obtain benefits from the perturbation (P is not
perturbed). At the same time, cooperators can form spatial
structures that are more robust against negative perturbations,
heaping the long term benefits of positive perturbations. In
other words, cooperators are able to form positive feedback
loops with the local positive payoff fluctuations, while defec-
tors cannot. This effect is very similar to what was observed
in [20, 77], where a very similar positive feedback loop helps
the promotion of cooperation for the so called multi-games.
Indeed, this seems to be a general property of evolutionary
games, i.e., cooperators can benefit from a variety of fluctua-
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vary D. Here we used T = 1.04. The inset shows the difference of
the ,average, fraternal and egotistic sub-populations, (CF − CE) as
well as (DE −DF ).
ρ
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2
T
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
S
 0
 0.1
 0.2
 0.3
 0.4
 0.5
 0.6
 0.7
 0.8
 0.9
 1a)
HG SD
PDSH
ρ−ρ0
 0  0.5  1  1.5  2
T
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
S
-1
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1b)
HG SD
PDSH
FIG. 10. T × S parameter space for the imitative model. Final
cooperation fraction is represented in colours. a) high perturbation
(D = 0.5) and b) difference (ρ− ρ0).
tions using positive feedback loops, whereas defectors cannot.
To conclude, we present the final average cooperation level
for the whole parameter space T × S considering all update
rules, i.e. Imitative (Figure 10), Ising (Figure 11) and WSLS
(Figure 12). For all figures, we report the case for a high per-
turbation (D = 0.5) in a) and the difference between the per-
turbed and unperturbed case, i.e. (ρ− ρ0), in b) for the whole
parameter space. We note that the parameter space for the un-
perturbed case can be found in the literature in [63] for the
Win-Stay-Lose-Shift, in [62] for the Ising model, and in [78]
for the imitative model.
This analysis indicates that the perturbation changes the
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FIG. 11. T × S parameter space for the Ising model. Final co-
operation fraction is represented in colours. a) high perturbation
(D = 0.5) and b) difference (ρ− ρ0).
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FIG. 12. T × S parameter space for the WSLS model. Final co-
operation fraction is represented in colours. a) high perturbation
(D = 0.5) and b) difference (ρ− ρ0).
8population dynamics mainly near phase transition regions. By
using all three updating rules, we can observe the general ef-
fect that perturbation increases cooperation in the direction of
more selfish games (i.e. high T , low S), while it does the
opposite for altruistic games. We also note that the detrimen-
tal effect on cooperation is usually lower than the benefit for
regions with high T and a low S. Eventually, we deem espe-
cially interesting that by using the Ising rule (see Figure 11),
the perturbation increases the anti-coordination area linearly
with the perturbation strength (top right region of the T × S
parameter space).
IV. CONCLUSIONS
In this work, we studied payoff perturbations considering
simple social dilemmas, with the main goal to clarify and
quantify their effects when only the off-diagonal is interested,
following the results reported in [1]. Beyond analysing per-
turbative methods in evolutionary games, the proposed model
has the potential to actively contribute to a vivid debate, i.e.
that on the relationship between heterogeneity and coopera-
tion. We emphasise that the form of heterogeneity we con-
sider is related to that of risk, and reward, perception, i.e. an
aspect covering a fundamental role in many social systems,
and that might also be relevant, using a different interpreta-
tion, in other contexts.
Then, while [1] focused on a general range of effects re-
sulting from perturbed payoffs, here we concentrate on the
strategy equilibrium reached by a population in presence of
perturbations acting only on the rewards of betraying and the
risks involved in getting betrayed (i.e. the temptation and the
sucker’s payoff). Hence, cooperators playing with coopera-
tors, and defectors playing with defectors, are not affected by
perturbations. In addition, here we analyse a wider range of
game parameters, i.e. near and far phase transition points, in
order to identify those values that allow perturbations to ac-
tively affect the dynamics of the game.
The evolution of strategies has been studied by Monte Carlo
simulations, arranging players on a square lattice with peri-
odic boundary conditions. To verify if the observed effects
were robust in different settings, we considered three differ-
ent update rules, Imitation, Win-Stay-Lose-Shift and Ising.
We also analised the effects of Gaussian and uniform noise
distributions.
Results show that perturbations can have more pronounced
effects on the population dynamics mainly near the phase tran-
sitions. Notably, the average evolution of a population showed
that the perturbations act very quickly, affecting mainly the
initial evolution. Also, this effect is proportional to the pertur-
bation amplitude when T > 1. At the same time, the damp-
ening in cooperation observed for T < 1 seems to be very
small in comparison. In addition, the overall effect of the per-
turbation seems to be independent of the specific choice of the
update rule, highlighting its robustness. Then, the analysis re-
lated to the combined effect of heterogeneity and irrationality
showed that these two perturbation sources are quite indepen-
dent each other.
In order to understand the microscopic mechanism respon-
sible for the cooperation enhancement near phase transitions,
we studied the sub-population of cooperators and defectors
that, locally, played more fraternal or egotistic games at each
time-step. This is in line with previous works, which proposed
that the benefit of diversity would be related to the random
changes in the game class (Prisoner’s Dilemma changing to
Stag-hunt or Snow-Drift) [49–51]. This approach allowed to
unveil what was responsible for the general effect observed in
all cases. On average, we found that the payoff perturbation
offers no unilateral contribution for more egotistic of frater-
nal games. Even so, it can locally promote cooperation for
players that had a more positive perturbation. This effect can
lead to the formation of stronger cooperative clusters, while
defectors cannot benefit from said phenomena in the long run
as they do not benefit from mutual support (see also [57]). On
the other hand, in [52] authors presented arguments on the ir-
relevance of game class changes for some contexts. While this
seems to be an open topic, our initial results indicate that the
random fluctuations have deep effects on the phase transitions
of the model, being able to improve cooperation thanks to the
unusual states found near phase transition points.
Summarising, our main finding is that off-diagonal pertur-
bations cannot be considered as a trivial form of noise, as
they seem to selectively enhance cooperation when defection
is pervading the population, while they are able to support
defection as the population begins to cooperate. Therefore,
in our view, the proposed model offers interesting insights
on a relevant aspect of heterogeneity, not limited only to the
studying of social phenomena. Notwithstanding, since sev-
eral details might deserve further attention, we report those
we consider potentially more interesting. For instance, the
proposed model could be analysed considering populations ar-
ranged on complex networks [79, 80], social behaviours like
conformism [81–83] could be combined with random pertur-
bations and, as suggested in [54], also some clinical investi-
gations could find useful to represent specific biological phe-
nomena by the proposed method.
Finally, we see as especially interesting the connection of
the payoff perturbation with recent works connecting evolu-
tionary game theory with the Hamiltonian description of phys-
ical systems [78, 84]. These effects could be further studied
in the light temporal Griffiths phases [61, 85]. Such an ex-
otic state is known to appear near phase transitions in epi-
demiological and magnetic systems with directed percolation
universality class, which is the same phase transition as the
imitative model [45].
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